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   1 
Purpose: The aim of this research was to undertake a two-phase desktop review of literature 2 
sources in order to conceptualise, frame, and critique existing whistleblowing models and 3 
strategies and consider how whistleblowing strategies form part of an effective food crime 4 
management system (FCMS) especially for small and medium sized organisations. 5 
Design: Existing literature from academic sources, financial, healthcare, food industries has 6 
been reviewed and critiqued in order to construct a conceptual framework that can inform 7 
future empirical research. 8 
Findings: Whistleblowing strategies can form an effective part of a FCMS. Appropriate 9 
regulatory protection of those who whistleblow is crucial to not only safeguard individuals 10 
but also to mitigate food crime and protect consumers from loss and potential harm. Barriers 11 
to whistleblowing exist and if these are not addressed then individuals will be reluctant to 12 
report food crime. Further empirical research is required to assess the influence of these and 13 
other factors identified in this research and how they can be overcome.  14 
Originality / Value: The framework will provide food industry practitioners with guidance 15 
on the effective application of whistleblowing strategies within a FCMS 16 
Keywords food, crime, countermeasure, whistleblowing, consumer protection, 17 
vulnerability 18 
1. Introduction 19 
 Whistleblowing can be a mode of ethical resistance (Glazer and Glazer, 1989); a 20 
vehicle to promote rights through movements such as consumer issues (Greenwood, 2015); or 21 
a process to give a voice to animal rights and environmental concerns with regard to an 22 
organisation’s practices. Whistleblowers are seen as either individuals who undertake heroic 23 
and noble deeds; or as malcontent, trouble-makers and misfits for exposing wrongdoing  24 
(Zakaria, 2015). The term ‘whistleblow’ was coined by Nader et al., (1972) as disclosure by 25 
organisational members of illegal, immoral, or illegitimate practices that are executed under 26 
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the control of their employers, to persons or organisations that may be able to effect action as 27 
a result of that disclosure (Miceli and Near, 1984; 1985; Near and Miceli, 1995; Near and 28 
Miceli, 2016). Publically Available Specification (PAS) 1998 (2008:9) Whistleblowing 29 
arrangements: Code of practice defines a whistleblowing concern as a “reasonable and honest 30 
suspicion an employee has about a possible fraud, danger or other serious risk that threatens 31 
customers, colleagues, shareholders, the public or the organisation’s own reputation”. 32 
 The authoritative individual that whistleblowers disclose to can be either internal to 33 
the organisation: e.g. a supervisor (Soeken, 2014), manager (Miller, 2015; The Economist, 34 
2015), or someone in the direct chain of command, or external such as regulatory officers or 35 
independent supervisory bodies, inspectors, auditors, the police, MPs, consumer/citizen 36 
groups, undercover reporters (Evans, 2014; Tang and Babich, 2014) or the media (Harris and 37 
Barrett, 2009; PAS 1998, 2008). The Ethics Resource Centre (2012) report that 84% of 38 
private sector employees stated they would report any wrongdoing internally, but only 18% 39 
would report to external parties. Whistleblowing is the only means of uncovering illicit 40 
practices instigated or condoned by senior management (Moy, 2015). Organisations benefit 41 
from early internal detection and prevention of criminal practices, so it is in their interest to 42 
facilitate this means of detecting, preventing or mitigating criminal activity. Further 43 
appropriate risk management with regard to criminal practice will deter potential food safety 44 
issues, product recall, profit loss, and will maintain integrity, reputation, trust and brand value 45 
for the organisation.  46 
 Organisations can implement a range of measures to reduce risk associated with 47 
criminal behaviour, such as implementing additional or upgrading existing procedures. The 48 
costs of a missed opportunity to address a criminal threat can be great: fines, requests for 49 
compensation, higher insurance premiums, a regulatory investigation, lost jobs, lost profits 50 
and even lost lives (PAS 1998:2008). External parties including regulators can benefit too 51 
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 3 
from saved resources to investigate illicit activities, prosecution and public services costs.  52 
The positive consequences of whistleblowing have been synthesized (Figure 1). 53 
Take in Figure 1 54 
 55 
 The aim of this research was to undertake a two-phase desktop review of literature 56 
sources in order to conceptualise, frame, critique existing whistleblowing strategies and to 57 
consider how whistleblowing strategies could be integrated within an effective food crime 58 
management system (FCMS). The scope of the review included peer-reviewed articles, trade 59 
publications and online news items. Regulatory sources were reviewed to provide examples 60 
of legislative frameworks adopted to provide protection to whistleblowers. The second phase 61 
of the review included analysis of literature sources to provide an evidence base for historic 62 
examples of disclosure of criminal activity in the food chain and to critique the context in 63 
which they had occurred. This analytical approach led to a preliminary conceptual 64 
characterisation of whistleblowers and the factors that influence them. Lastly, the value of 65 
whistleblowing strategies in the food sector was considered and critiqued. In this context food 66 
crime has a wide focus and illegal activity can span fo d safety and food quality issues as 67 
equally as illicit activity and behaviour. The aim of this paper is not to contextualise what 68 
constitutes food crime specifically, but to look at the use of formal whistleblowing strategies 69 
within a FCMS to mitigate and, where possible prevent, illegal activity. If the food industry 70 
wants to effectively counter illicit and illegal practice, it must proactively ensure that internal 71 
reporting channels are available for staff. If these protocols do not exist, there is increased risk 72 
that external channels will be used to disclose wrongdoing and prevent an organisation from 73 
rectifying the problem internally first (Near and Miceli, 1985). This highlights the importance 74 
of whistleblowing as a management control mechanism to identify, mitigate and where 75 
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 4 
possible deter wrongdoing. The next section of the paper focuses on examples of 76 
whistleblowing in the food industry. 77 
2. Whistleblowing and whistleblowers 78 
 Previous studies of whistleblowing mostly involve corporate or public sector 79 
malpractice such as corruption (Schultz and Harutyunyan, 2015), police agencies (Park and 80 
Blenkinsopp, 2009; Rothwell and Baldwin, 2006), accounting and financial reporting (Hwang 81 
et al., 2008, 2013), auditing (Alleyne et al., 2013; Arnold and Ponemon, 1991; Brennan and 82 
Kelly, 2007; Maroun and Solomon, 2014), government agencies (Cho and Song, 2015), and 83 
healthcare (Philipsen and Soeken, 2011). Within the health setting, McDonald and Ahern 84 
(2000) reported that health workers who reported misconduct were subjected to severe official 85 
reprisals including demotion, reprimand and referral to a psychiatrist. There were also 86 
instances of individuals experiencing threats, rejection by peers, pressure to resign and being 87 
treated as a traitor, or experiencing a lack of progression in their career. Hwang et al., (2008, 88 
2013) assert that personal relationships, fear of retaliation and also media coverage discourage 89 
whistleblowing in Chinese society. Vinten (1996) associated the act of whistleblowing to a 90 
“bee-sting phenomenon” suggesting the approach can only be used once, before the act itself 91 
jeopardises the career of the whistleblower. Thus it is a high-stakes action and the potential 92 
consequences post-reporting (both positive and negative) will influence an individual’s 93 
decision to either remain silent or to blow the whistle.  94 
 The PAWC (2013) report “Whistleblowing – The Inside Story” reviewed 1000 cases 95 
between August 2009 and December 2010 across all industry sectors. Food and beverage 96 
cases represented just 3% of the total cases so the results cannot be critiqued to reflect the 97 
food supply chain specifically, however overarching themes associated with whistleblowing 98 
can be determined. The whistleblowers’ position was identified as executives (2%), 99 
managerial (15%), professional (26%), skilled (27%) unskilled (13%) and administrative 100 
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(8%). This complies with the conclusions of Miceli et al., (2008) that whistleblowers are 101 
more likely to be older, have more experience, work at supervisory levels, with higher pay, 102 
and feel a sense of responsibility for reporting wrongdoing, and have greater knowledge of 103 
appropriate internal channels. Whistleblowers can be motivated by moral purposes, 104 
professional integrity (Motarjemi, 2014), courage (Zakaria, 2015), internal locus of control 105 
(Chiu, 2003) and being proactive (Bjørkelo et al., 2010). Whistleblowers tend to have more 106 
positive reactions to their work, be male and belonged to larger work groups (Miceli and 107 
Near, 1988) with knowledge of circumstances and the individuals involved in fraudulent 108 
practices (Zakaria, 2015). These characteristics highlight the individual or personal factors 109 
that encourage whistleblowing a theme drawn upon later in the paper. 110 
 Wider constructs of organisational culture and subjective norms will influence the 111 
intention to whistleblow.  Subjective norm is the perceived social pressure to engage, or not in 112 
a given behaviour in this case whistleblowing. Alleyne et al., (2013) suggest that norms 113 
provide implicit guidelines and team norms are a moderating variable that create legitimate, 114 
socially shared standards against which an individual’s behaviour is measured (see Chatman 115 
and Flynn, 2001). Thus a whistleblower on the one hand can be seen as a member of a team 116 
or group who then goes against such team norms and attempts to change improper group 117 
behaviour (Miceli and Near, 1984 cited by Greenwood, 2015) or alternatively follows an 118 
organisational, team or group culture that welcomes whistleblowing. In previous research, the 119 
Theory of Planned Behaviour (TPB) see Fishbein and Ajzen (1975); Ajzen and Fishbein, 120 
(1980) and the Theory of Reasoned Action (TRA) see Ajzen (1985; 1991) have been used to 121 
study how attitudes and subjective norms affects an individual’s behaviour towards food 122 
handling, consumption and purchase (Bianchi and Mortimer, 2015; Irianto, 2015; Mullan et 123 
al., 2015), but not whistleblowing specifically in the food sector and this is worthy of further 124 
study and explored further in this paper.  125 
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 6 
 Historic whistleblowing cases in the food industry suggest that whistleblowers 126 
themselves suffer negative personal consequences including: depression and symptoms of 127 
extremely poor mental health (Motarjemi, 2015a; 2015b); altered responsibilities (Dyck et al., 128 
2010), refusal of pay increment, lack of peer support (Curtis, 2006), removal from usual 129 
duties (Soeken, 2014), loss of employment (Motarjemi, 2014; Motarjemi, 2015a; Philipsen 130 
and Soeken, 2011), stigma associated with being a “troublemaker” (Philipsen and Soeken, 131 
2011); psychological harassment (Motarjemi, 2015a);  resignation under duress (Dyck et al., 132 
2010), threats of revenge and isolation (Tan and Ong, 2011), and possibly even murder 133 
(Zhuang, 2012). Ponemon (1994) suggest that the nature and extent of the retaliation imposed 134 
by the organisation’s management or co-workers against the whistleblower is perhaps the 135 
most significant determinant of a whistleblower’s intention to disclose wrongdoing. 136 
Furthermore, if whistleblowers seek personal redress from organisations for the personal 137 
consequences of their disclosure, in the event that the case comes to court, corporate bodies if 138 
they so choose have significant financial resources to “buy witnesses, delay the legal 139 
processes and exert political pressure” leaving the employee in question unable to progress 140 
with new employment or to have closure (Motarjemi, 2015a).  141 
 As part of this research a range of contemporary whistleblowing case studies across 142 
the food industry have been drawn together. The cases reflect issues such as potential animal 143 
welfare violations, bribery, corruption, and negligence with regard to food safety and food 144 
quality issues (Table 1). Disclosure was conducted both internally, and also externally to 145 
parties such as regulators or the media. 146 
Take in Table 1 147 
 148 
 The breadth of the scope of examples shown in Table 1 demonstrates that it is difficult 149 
to draw boundaries around, define and contextualize types of illicit behaviour associated with 150 
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the food chain and that need to be addressed within an organisation’s FCMS. Illicit behaviour 151 
is not binary in terms of products, activities or actors and often reflects an acceptance of 152 
customary illegality i.e. the acceptance and tolerance of illicit activities by predominantly 153 
legal economic actors (Gregson and Crang, 2016). Factors that can drive customary illegality 154 
including market competition and resource scarcity, inadequate governance, lack of sanctions 155 
and low probability of discovery, rapid development of systems, logistics and technology, 156 
data swamping and opacity (Charlebois et al. 2016; Manning et al. 2016; Manning, 2016; 157 
Marvin et al. 2016). Opacity, even food crime itself, is driven by market dynamics and 158 
seeking to survive in market economies with organisations that have better economies of scale 159 
or operate as oligopolies  (Manning et al., 2016). 160 
 161 
2. Food crime 162 
, Many illicit practices go undetected by both regulatory authorities and senior 163 
management in food businesses. Hence, the discovery of such practices often relies on 164 
individuals who report wrongdoing. Illicit activities elude formal enumeration and 165 
measurement and circumvent institutional systems, regulations and associated enforcement 166 
penalties (Feige, 1990). Further, the types of process verification activities undertaken in 167 
market-focused second party audits and third party certification audits are constrained by the 168 
scope of the system standards used, the planned nature, the time available and the frequency 169 
of the audits, and the volume of data to be assessed (Manning, 2013; Manning and Soon,  170 
2014). Illicit behaviour in the food supply chain arises as a result of misrepresentation 171 
associated with: 172 
• product integrity: the intrinsic quality attribute of totality or completeness 173 
(Manning and Soon, 2014);  174 
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• process integrity: the activities undertaken to produce the food item encompassing 175 
the design, assurance, monitoring and verification of processes within the product 176 
life-cycle to ensure that they remain authentic and intact, i.e. extrinsic characteristics;  177 
• people integrity: the honesty and morals exhibited by an individual; and/or  178 
• data integrity: the consistency and accuracy of data through the food product life-179 
cycle (Manning, 2016) 180 
 Food crime prevention measures can utilise well-established tools such as Six Sigma 181 
and hazard analysis critical control point (HACCP) methodologies (Moyer et al., 2017), 182 
HACCP being routinely associated with food safety and legality. Similarly the use of threat 183 
analysis critical control point (TACCP) and vulnerability analysis critical control point 184 
(VACCP) methodologies such as Publically Available Specification Guide to Protecting and 185 
Defending Food and Drink from Deliberate Attack (PAS 96: 2014) and CARVER+SHOCK 186 
have utility in addressing wider food crime. Effective countermeasures within a FCMS reduce 187 
criminal opportunity (Spink et al., 2015).  Countermeasures can be developed to mitigate risk 188 
associated with food crime and illicit behaviour with regard to all four elements of food 189 
integrity: product, process, people and data. Spink et al., (2016) suggest that crime 190 
countermeasures fall into five distinct categories: detection i.e. the identification of 191 
opportunity, mapping of the food chain to identify vulnerabilities or hotspots, deterrence by 192 
inhibiting opportunity to commit crime, prevention through promotion of the robust 193 
management systems and disruption should crime occur. Indeed there must be a holistic 194 
approach whereby detection and deterrence countermeasures operate in consort as elements of 195 
a FCMS that includes a product testing programme (Moyer et al., 2017). However, advanced 196 
product testing methods require highly technical laboratory skills and the tests incur 197 
considerable cost that supply chain pressures may not be able to bear, putting this option 198 
beyond the financial resources also be overcome by strategic, competent and knowledgeable 199 
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actors, thus unless it is part of a wider integrated FCMS it can be of limited value. Detection, 200 
mapping and prevention activities can only be developed to address known issues or activities 201 
making TACCP and VACCP also of limited value with regard to emerging and novel illicit 202 
behaviour or entrepreneurial, enterprising, situational crime risk that is reactive, responsive 203 
and specific to an organisation, the products it produces and the associated supply chain. 204 
3. Food crime management 205 
 Food crime is undertaken by individuals and/or groups with varying criminal and 206 
business modus operandi (Manning et al., 2016). FCMS can be both transactional and 207 
transformational in nature. Transactional processes focus on the policies, procedures and 208 
protocols, often called pre-requisites that drive formal management of food crime and 209 
illegality and minimise risk (Manning et al., 2016). Conversely, transformational processes 210 
encompass both formal and informal organisational culture and the role of employees, 211 
irrespective of formal responsibilities, in enabling the organisation to maintain legal and 212 
ethical practice and to detect, deter and disrupt criminal activity. Transformational elements 213 
of a FCMS seek to inspire staff to consider that food legality and compliance is important and 214 
to empower them to realise fully their specific role in ensuring compliance. Further 215 
employees need to be aware that there is always the potential for emerging or re-emerging 216 
crime challenges that must be effectively controlled, or where possible eliminated. Thus 217 
whistleblowing strategies need to be embedded into both the transactional FCMS to ensure 218 
that individuals are aware of the organisation’s systems and procedures and also in the 219 
transformational culture. Senior management must demonstrate both through their 220 
commitment to the FCMS in terms of both engagement and appropriate resource allocation 221 
and also in their overseeing of an effective business culture that demonstrates that in a 222 
transparent business such strategies are welcomed and adopted as part of a wider corporate 223 
disclosure discourse. Lamming et al., (2001) determine that there is a spectrum between 224 
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transparency and opacity proposing that organisations can work in a form of corporate 225 
“hinterland” in terms of their selective discourse. Therefore, crime risk increases in this 226 
hinterland where transactional controls do not operate as intended and an informal culture can 227 
not only just exist, but flourish.  228 
 Criminal organisations and networks complement and interact with traditional markets 229 
and supply chains reducing transaction costs, and providing increased business opportunities 230 
for both buyers and sellers (Williams, 2001). This entrepreneurial illicit approach (Manning et 231 
al., 2016) is in contrast to the regulatory hierarchical mindset, bureaucratic rivalry and 232 
competition, interagency antipathies, and hesitancy to share information, align databases or 233 
coordinate enforcement operations (Williams, 2001). This makes crime mitigation activities 234 
often less agile and reactive than the criminal networks they are seeking to disrupt. Whilst 235 
FCMS are of value, integrated reactive measures such as whistleblowing protocols are 236 
essential too. 237 
 238 
3. Regulatory response towards protecting whistleblowers 239 
3.1 European Union  240 
 The European Committee on Legal Co-operating (CDCJ) of the Council of Europe 241 
developed the Recommendation CM/Rec (2014)7 on the protection of whistleblowers 242 
(Council of Europe 2014). Member states are encouraged to develop a robust national 243 
framework that facilitates and protects whistleblowers. The Recommendation sets out a 244 
number of key principles to ensure that: laws to protect whistleblowers cover a broad range of 245 
information that is in the public interest; individuals have access to more than one channel to 246 
report and disclose such sensitive information; mechanisms are in place to ensure reports and 247 
disclosures are acted upon promptly; whistleblowers are entitled to have their identities kept 248 
confidential by those to whom they report; and all forms of retaliation are prohibited as long 249 
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as the individual whistleblower has reasonable grounds to believe in the accuracy and 250 
credibility of the information. 251 
 Four EU member states have advanced whistleblower protection laws including the 252 
United Kingdom (UK), Luxembourg, Romania and Slovenia. Of the other twenty-three EU 253 
member states, sixteen include partial legal protection for whistleblowers in the public and/or 254 
private sectors. For example, in October 2012, Italy included into its Anti-Corruption Law the 255 
country’s first ever provision intended to legally protect government employees against 256 
negative implications linked to disclosure acts of wrongdoing. Previously, Italy has no 257 
specific whistleblowing protection laws in place (World Law Group 2012). There were 258 
cultural barriers in Italy where whistleblowing was viewed as treason (Osterhaus and Fagan, 259 
2007) or betrayal (Dungan et al. 2015). Efforts by workers’ unions in Italy to protect 260 
whistleblowers led to the proposed amendments to Italy’s Anti-Corruption Law (G20 Anti-261 
Corruption Action Plan, 2010). The Italian public sector can report wrongdoing as long as it is 262 
not committed out of defamation or intent to harm a person’s right to privacy. The act 263 
however, does not apply to the private sector. There has been a call by Transparency 264 
International Italia for wider protection covering employees in both public and private sectors 265 
(Worth, 2013). In France, a new anti-corruption law was adopted on December 9, 2016 (Law 266 
2016-1691) the so called “Law Sapin II”. This strengthened the law with regard to 267 
whistleblowing particularly against discrimination or retaliation against whistleblowers. The 268 
law lays down precise requirements that provide context to whether a whistleblower would be 269 
entitled to protection under the law (WIN, 2017a). The remaining seven countries (i.e. 270 
Bulgaria, Finland, Greece, Lithuania, Portugal, Slovakia and Spain) have limited or no legal 271 
frameworks (Transparency International’s Secretariat, 2013). 272 
  In the UK, the Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998 protected workers from unfair 273 
treatment or victimisation from their employer if they reported wrongdoing in the workplace 274 
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(FSA, 2016a). Employees, who are aware of wrongdoing within the food industry, including 275 
suspecting or witnessing of a breach in welfare of an animal at slaughter, can disclose that 276 
wrongdoing under the protection the Act affords if they raise their concerns in accordance 277 
with the Act’s provisions. A given act of disclosure is a qualifying disclosure for 278 
whistleblowing if the worker reasonably believes one or more of the following has occurred: 279 
criminal offence, breach of a legal obligation, miscarriage of justice, danger to the health and 280 
safety of any individual, damage to the environment and deliberate concealment of 281 
information is happening currently, occurred in the past or is likely to happen in the future 282 
(FSA, 2016b). In implementing this Act, the UK Food Standards Agency (FSA) has extended 283 
protection to food industry workers, whether or not the information is confidential, and 284 
whether or not the wrongdoing occurred in the UK itself (Motarjemi, 2014).  285 
 In the aftermath of the 2013 European horsemeat incident, the FSA’s National Food 286 
Crime Unit (NFCU) was created as a result of the recommendations in the Elliott Review 287 
(2014) to help ensure that prevention measures are put in place to protect consumers from 288 
food fraud (FSA n.d.). In addition to setting up the Unit, the Elliot Review strongly 289 
recommended firstly that any incident of suspected and known food crime should be reported 290 
directly by staff to their own employers and secondly that customers can report to 291 
management any potential concerns (Elliot Review, 2014). Further there should be 292 
encouragement of a culture within the food industry that questions sourcing in its supply 293 
chain and also wider food integrity. However, the mechanisms that enable whistleblowing 294 
and reporting with the food industry, including regulatory bodies, need developing further. 295 
The whistleblowing procedures and facilities provided by the NFCU enable potential 296 
whistleblowers to disclose confidentially (FSA, 2016a, 2016b) dishonesty at any stage within 297 
the production or supply of food, drink or animal feed (FSA, 2016b). Members of the public 298 
are encouraged to whistleblow or to report suspicions of food fraud to their local authority or 299 
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the NFCU (FSA, 2016a). All intelligence received is logged on the Food Fraud Database 300 
(FFD) and the identity of the whistleblower protected at all times. Outcomes are logged on 301 
the Food Fraud Database and if requested reported back to the whistleblower (FSA, 2016a; 302 
IMTA, 2016). Food safety and quality concerns can also be raised via the FSA’s “Report a 303 
food problem” site targeted specifically on local food businesses (FSA, 2016c). The UK FFD 304 
serves as an important source of intelligence and a tool to detect emerging patterns of 305 
fraudulent and criminal activities (FSA, 2016a, d). In 2011, there were 54 complaints ans in 306 
2012 81 such complaints. The food fraud team handled 134 cases in 2013 that comprised sale 307 
of unfit food (42), general hygiene issues (39), mis-description (13), illegal re-dating of food 308 
(7), single cases each of adulteration and authenticity  (Elliot Review, 2014). 309 
3.2 United States 310 
The United States (US) has one of the most comprehensive whistleblower provisions 311 
developed in relation to the Sarbanes and Oxley Act (SOX) and was passed by the US 312 
congress to protect general public and shareholders from fraudulent practices in financial 313 
markets (Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 2002; Schultz and Harutyunyan, 2015).  Under the US Food 314 
and Drug Administration (FDA), the Food Safety Modernization Act (FSMA, 2011) Section 315 
402 prohibit retaliation by food businesses against whistleblowers who have: provided 316 
information relating to any violation of the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (FD&C) to the 317 
employer, the Federal Government, or the attorney general of a State; testified, assisted, or 318 
participated in a proceeding concerning a violation of the FD&C or; objected to or refused to 319 
participate in any activity that he or she reasonably believed to be in violation of the FD&C 320 
(FSMA, 2011; Moy, 2015; OSHA, 2014). This regulation has driven the development of 321 
whistleblowing procedures to comply with the US Sarbanes-Oxley Act (Osterhaus and Fagan, 322 
2007).   323 
3.3 Serbia 324 
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On 25 November 2014, the Parliament of Serbia adopted the Law on the Protection of 325 
Whistleblowers, the law coming into force in June 2015 (WIN, 2017b). The legislation 326 
clearly describes the act of whistleblowing, the rights and entitlements to protection not only 327 
of the whistleblower themselves, but also the officials who are then required to perform a duty 328 
to investigate. Indeed every employer with more than ten employees by law is required to 329 
endorse an internal whistleblowing procedure. The procedure must be in a visible, accessible 330 
location for all employees and it must also be posted on the company website if the company 331 
has one. Fines can be imposed if businesses fail to undertake this requirement. There are also 332 
strict timings set for competent authorities to adhere to in the event of external disclosure of 333 
wrongdoing. 334 
 335 
4. Market response towards protecting whistleblowers 336 
 The UK Department of Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS) issued a report in March 337 
2015 titled “Whistleblowing: Guidance for Employers and Code of Practice (BIS, 2015). The 338 
report states that whilst a voluntary requirement it is good business practice to create an open, 339 
transparent and safe working environment through implementing a whistleblowing policy in 340 
the workplace. Depending on the nature and size of the business, PAS 1998 (2008) outlines 341 
that overall responsibility for enabling whistleblowing should rest with either the Board, 342 
Chief Executive, Group Secretary, with routine responsibility falling to the human resources 343 
department. In a small food business with both strategic and operational roles filled by one or 344 
two individuals this could prove more difficult to disassociate. 345 
 In this research the development of whistleblowing policies as a market response has 346 
been considered with three cases using publically available policies for Associated British 347 
Foods (ABF) plc, Home Retail Group (HRG) plc, and Tesco plc. ABF (2016) state that the 348 
purpose of their voluntary whistleblowing policy is to protect individuals working within their 349 
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organisation when raising matters of public interest to stop malpractice and wrongdoing. The 350 
organisation outlines a five step plan: 351 
• Step 1: Inform manager or head of department; 352 
• Step 2: raise the matter with alternative internal contacts if unable to raise with line 353 
manager; 354 
• Step 3: Initial assessment and determination of corporate action; and 355 
• Step 4: Opportunity if response/outcome is not deemed sufficient to raise the matter 356 
with others internally. 357 
• Step 5: If steps 1 to 4 cannot be followed then contact external confidential 358 
whistleblowing hotline Expolink.  359 
Expolink are a privately owned organisation, founded in 1995, that specialise in providing 360 
whistleblowing hotlines supporting over 20% of FTSE 100 companies, many FTSE 250 and 361 
Fortune 500 companies, local authorities, government departments, police forces and multi-362 
national corporations (Expolink, 2016a). Expolink (2016b) report that 3.3 million employees 363 
made contact in the January-June 2016 period with an incidence rate of 1.24 reports per 1000 364 
employees from a range of organisations. Fifty three percent of the reports were anonymous, 365 
with seventy percent made by telephone. The issues raised by order of frequency were: 366 
malpractice (9.9%), fraud (5.1%), theft (3.7%), security (1.6%), corruption (1.3%), other 367 
(78.4%). The frequency of theft and fraud from 2009 – 2016 (Table 2) shows a reporting 368 
frequency of 10% in 2009 down to 3.7% of contacts in 2016 and for fraud a reporting 369 
frequency of 8% in 2009 down to 5% in 2016. 370 
Take in Table 2 371 
 372 
HRG (2016) also has a five step approach for raising issues: 373 
• Step 1: Raise with line manager; 374 
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• Step 2: Raise with line manager’s manager either as a first contact or if individual 375 
raising issue is unhappy with the initial response in Step 1; 376 
• Step 3: Raise at Director level if these two steps have not given the response to the 377 
individuals satisfaction; 378 
• Step 4: Internal enquiry or more formal investigation; and 379 
• Step 5: Formal arrangements for a third party legal advice organisation in this case 380 
Public Concern at Work (PCAW). This organisation can give advice on external 381 
disclosure. PCAW are a charity established in 1993 (PCAW, 2016).  382 
The Whistleblowing Tesco Colleague and Suppliers Protector Line Policy outlines how 383 
Protector Line, a confidential telephone and email service, operates for both internal and 384 
external stakeholders (Tesco, 2016). Suppliers can report concerns on a website that is 385 
managed by Expolink. Thus all three organisations have similar reporting systems using a 386 
specific external contractor to address whistleblowing that is either not raised internally, or 387 
has been raised but not addressed to the satisfaction of the person raising the concerned. It is 388 
important in all these cases to differentiate between an employment grievance and an instance 389 
of whistleblowing. PAS 1998:2008 states that an employment grievance is a dispute or 390 
private complaint regarding the employee’s own employment position and therefore it has no 391 
additional public interest dimension. These cases show that a positive whistleblowing culture 392 
and environment associated with an ethical culture practiced by the organisation encourages 393 
staff to have strong conscience to report wrongdoing (Miceli et al., 2008; Mendonca, 2011). 394 
Depending on national culture, some societies fear shame but not necessarily guilt (e.g. China 395 
is a shame-based society), hence shame can be used as an effective mechanism to enforce 396 
staff compliance (Tang and Babich, 2014). In contrast, a culture with supportive supervisors, 397 
appropriate formal structures for reporting (Brennan and Kelly, 2007) and protection afforded 398 
to whistleblowers (Cho and Song, 2015; Zakaria, 2015) will drive whistleblowers to report 399 
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wrongdoing. The challenge with purely voluntary governance measures, rather than the 400 
Serbian approach, that each organisation will develop their own discrete protocols that can 401 
vary in their degree of efficacy. Thus personal (individual), organisational/cultural and 402 
situational factors (Dungan et al. 2015). are now explored further in the paper. 403 
 404 
5. Whistleblowing models   405 
A number of whistleblowing models exist in the literature that have been designed to address 406 
mainly corporate fraud in the financial, business and public sectors but none specifically for 407 
food industry. These have been analysed within this research (Table 3). The models often 408 
reflect individual (Henik, 2015), organisational (Alleyne et al., 2013; Brennan and Kelly, 409 
2007) and cultural factors (Hwang et al., 2008). Although many studies have applied the TRA 410 
and TPB to food and food service sectors, little research has dealt with their application to 411 
whistleblowing. Table 3 then provides the context for the potential application within a food 412 
production or supply chain setting. Henik (2015 citing Goldberg et al., 1999) describes three 413 
types of whistleblower: (i) the strategic moral guardian (SMG); (ii) the fed-up vigilante 414 
(FUV) and (iii) the inactive individual called in this research as the servant of two masters 415 
(STM) see Table 4.  416 
Take in Tables 3 and 4 417 
 418 
 Henik (2015) draws upon existing theory to discuss a five-stage whistleblowing model 419 
around which organisational whistleblowing strategies, such as those described in this paper 420 
for ABF and HRG, can be developed.   421 
Stage 1 – A trigger event 422 
 A trigger event is as an event that is deemed by an individual or group to be 423 
problematic (Henik, 2015). Factors that can trigger whistleblowing include internal 424 
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motivation (Schultz and Harutyunyan, 2015), personal responsibility (Hwang et al., 2008, 425 
2013), seriousness of wrongdoing (Graham, 1986; Curtis, 2006) and loyalty towards the 426 
company (Dungan et al., 2015) see Table 3. An individual trigger may be clear in terms of its 427 
legality or the trigger may be opaque creating uncertainty as to whether to raise the issue with 428 
others (PAWC, 2013).   429 
Stage 2 – Determining of appropriate action 430 
 The whistleblower may be concerned whether complicity means that they themselves 431 
may face sanction and this may limit action. PAWC (2013) identify in their study that in only 432 
8% of the cases they examined the whistleblower admitted that they have been involved in the 433 
issue themselves. Other factors that affect willingness to take action are fear of reprisal or 434 
retailiation, being unsure whether the activities warrant action, uncertainty over what action is 435 
possible and appropriate and the opportunity cost versus the benefit or having little faith that 436 
any corrective action will be done (PAWC, 2013; Henik, 2015 citing March and Simon, 1958; 437 
Latané and Darley, 1970; Miceli and Near, 1992).  However, Henik (2015) argues it is 438 
emotion and value conflict that actually motivates action or inaction. Stage 2 is a crucial stage 439 
in the whistleblowing process as individual, organisational and situational factors play a 440 
mediating role in encouraging or discouraging potential whistleblowers.  441 
Stage 3 – Action of whistleblowing 442 
 PAWC (2013) suggest that a whistleblower’s position in an organisation will be a 443 
factor that influences the route they follow to raise their concern. The group of workers they 444 
identified as less likely to approach their line manager or senior management was unskilled 445 
workers. In fact their study suggested that unskilled and skilled workers were more likely to 446 
approach the individual(s) who they thought was the wrongdoer or disclose to an independent 447 
body rather than other workers, or finally a regulatory body. This highlights if people are to 448 
come forward with concerns that as well as transactional structure in the FCMS, 449 
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transformational elements such as an open culture, training and coaching are required. 450 
Administrative workers were more likely to approach senior management or a union 451 
representative through and use the employment grievance procedure rather than follow a 452 
whistleblowing process or a specialist channel. This may be due to the type of trigger that 453 
they were reporting, or greater awareness of policy and practice, but they were reticent about 454 
approaching their line manager. Managers and executives were more likely to raise their 455 
concern initially to senior management and also more likely to approach the media. 456 
Ultimately, in order to prevent or reduce loss of profit, reputation and trust with customers, 457 
the food industry should aim to resolve the problems internally whilst ensuring confidentiality 458 
for the whistleblowers.  459 
Stage 4 – Organisational reaction to action 460 
 PAWC (2013) state that from their dataset whistleblowers felt that no action was taken after 461 
the first attempt of internal disclosure in 74% of cases and this rose to 80% when it was 462 
unskilled workers who wore making the disclosure. At the third attempt in 44% of cases 463 
whistleblowers felt there was no organisational reaction; this was zero cases at executive 464 
level, but still 80% for unskilled workers. The work of Henik (2015) shows that the 465 
organisation needs to make sure that they do not alienate the individuals who seek to disclose 466 
potential wrongdoing especially as this can then provide personal motivation for justice and 467 
restitution. Ensuring there is full confidence in the management process surrounding 468 
whistleblowing is critical.  469 
Stage 5 – Whistleblowers response 470 
 The whistleblowers who actively report on wrongdoing are the SMG or FUV (see 471 
Table 4 for definitions). Inaction can be due to conflicting emotions and values. Therefore, a 472 
FCMS encompassing both transformational and transactional approaches will be beneficial to 473 
encourage the STM to act. Henik (2015) asserts that a differentiation of emotion will 474 
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influence the methods and aims of a given whistleblowing disclosure and the whistleblowers 475 
response and whilst SMG retain their focus on halting wrongful activities, FUV will focus on 476 
the desire for restitution. The causal factors that underpin the five steps outlined above and 477 
their interrelationship with an associated FCMS have been conceptualised in Table 5 and 478 
represented visually in Figure 2. Understanding these factors will assist food industry 479 
practitioners and regulators to develop policies, guidance and best practice. These 480 
transactional and transformational elements are now explored. 481 
Take in Table 5 and Figure 2 482 
 Adoption of crime countermeasures is based unique assessment by each organisation, 483 
the organisation’s risk appetite and the unique crime opportunity of the given supply system 484 
(Spink et al., 2016). These countermeasures then need to be integrated into an effective 485 
FCMS. Countermeasures are intended to reduce criminal opportunity so if appropriate 486 
countermeasure strategies are to be developed and adopted then it is important to establish 487 
both the type of crime and the typology of the criminal (Manning, 2016; Manning et al., 488 
2016; Spink et al., 2015). Organisations should as part of this approach recognise and 489 
accommodate effective whistleblowing channels. Failure to do so could lead to what 490 
Motarjemi (2015a) describes as “wild whistleblowing” i.e. extra-legal or illegal approaches to 491 
reporting or disclosing information through internet “leaking” type approaches. Further, a 492 
condoning of negative behaviour towards whistleblowers leads to a repressive, unhealthy 493 
management culture (Motarjemi, 2015b) that ultimately will stifle employee loyalty, and the 494 
potential for innovation, creativity and new ideas within the organisation. 495 
 Loehr and Kaye (2011) have proposed the use of the 5 C’s framework in order to 496 
encourage and build a loyal and committed workforce. This can be extended to consider the 497 
integration of a whistleblowing strategy within a FCMS. The five “C’s have been adapted in 498 
this context: 499 
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• Commit to employees’ professional growth and success so that they feel personally 500 
invested in by the organisation and then as a result less likely to be compelled to 501 
commit food crime;  502 
• Communicate the organisational culture that is needed to minimise the potential for 503 
food crime to all levels of staff and in the context that they will understand; 504 
• Clarify organisational goals in terms of legality, product and personal integrity and 505 
their role in helping to achieve them; 506 
• Coach through providing appropriate and continuous training for employees so they 507 
feel empowered to support the organisation and ensuring the products and services are 508 
legally compliant and if necessary disclose with regard to wrongdoing; and 509 
• Create accountability through a formal yet dynamic and reactive system that has 510 
appropriate communication channels and assists employees to deliver their roles and 511 
commitments at all levels of the organisation. 512 
The 5 Cs demonstrate the transformational infrastructure that needs to be in place to underpin 513 
the FCMS. A cultural shift towards an encouraging, and supportive environment for 514 
whistleblowing can provide a source of intelligence that can help organisations to prevent 515 
potential public health implications, loss of profit and protect the reputation of company.     In 516 
the development and implementation of a FCMS, small and medium sized food companies 517 
may not have the resources and knowledge necessary to carry out risk assessments using tools 518 
such as VACCP or TACCP, but with appropriate industry guidance they can more readily 519 
implement a whistleblowing protocol within their organisation and with their suppliers.  520 
 With appropriate induction and refresher training, and ongoing coaching an 521 
effective, and reactive FCMS can be developed which is appropriate to the situational needs 522 
of every business. Indeed PAS 1998:2008 states that where the business is small and everyone 523 
is known by name, transformational management processes may be strong enough so that a 524 
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complicated written protocol is not required, instead a simple statement will be of value to 525 
that simply explains: the difference between whistleblowing and a private complaint with 526 
management; how an employee can make an external disclosure and the benefits of an 527 
independent helpline that facilitates the disclosure process; that whistleblowing is not a 528 
mechanism for undermining managers; and the challenges with maintaining confidentiality. 529 
 530 
6. Concluding remarks 531 
Whistleblowing exposes illegal, inappropriate and fraudulent practices with the goal that 532 
private and/or public exposure will force change. Many of these criminal practices go 533 
undetected by regulatory authorities and at times senior management of an organisation. 534 
Conventional behavioural models such as TRA and TPB can be extended to include 535 
individual, organisational, cultural and situational factors to study whistleblowing intention 536 
among food production workers and this has been the approach used in this conceptual paper 537 
in developing Figure 2. Greater understanding not only the forward process, but also the 538 
feedback loops, and the situational factors of influence will assist food industry practitioners 539 
in developing effective FCMS that include a whistleblowing strategy.  Therefore appropriate 540 
regulatory protection of those who engage in whistleblowing activities is crucial to both 541 
mitigate food crime and protect consumers from loss and potential harm. Without considering 542 
the specific difficulties that arise and addressing the existing barriers to whistleblowing it is 543 
unlikely that the whistleblowing can become an effective strategy for addressing food crime. 544 
Therefore further empirical research is required to assess the influence of these barriers and 545 
how they can be overcome. The model in this paper provides opportunity for such primary 546 
research. 547 
  548 
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Table 1. Examples of whistleblowing incidents in the food industry 991 
Year Description of 
whistleblower 
Internal Whistleblower 
(WB) 
External (Official) 
WB 
External (Media) 
WB 
Description Outcome References 
2006 
ongoing 
Food safety 
manager of Nestle  
Reported  there was an 
inadequate process in 
validating the nutrient 
content of infant formula 
biscuits that could result 
in babies choking  and 
incorrectly labelled 
packaging.  
  Request for audit of her 
department was turned 
down. The former food 
safety manager is 
claiming $2million 
compensation plus an 
allowance for lost 
earnings. 
Claims of acts of reprisal 
including being ‘treated like a 
child’ and being humiliated. 
Both the former food safety 
manager and Nestle failed to 
agree on a settlement and the 
case went to trial. 
Miller (2015); 
The Economist 
(2015) 
2008 Manager at Peanut 
Corporation of 
America (PCA) 
(Texas processing 
plant) 
Report to the Chief 
Executive Officer (CEO) 
of PCA about rodent 
infestation and leaky roof. 
The CEO did not respond 
to the manager.  
Manager then 
reported to Texas 
Department of 
Health, and did not 
receive response.  
Subsequently, 
Texas authorities 
searched their 
database but found 
no record of emails 
from the manager. 
The manager finally 
whistleblew to Safe 
Tables Our Priority 
(STOP) a national 
health organisation 
and went on Good 
Morning America. 
The manager was 
triggered to whistleblow 
when his/her 
granddaughter became ill 
after eating peanut butter 
crackers. 
PCA went bankrupt and on 
September 2015, the former 
CEO of PCA was sentenced 
to 28 years in prison. 
Basu (2015); 
Harris and 
Barrett (2009); 
Near and Micelli 
(2016) 
2008 Truck drivers (PCA)   Truck drivers 
whistleblew to media 
Packages of peanut paste 
burst in truck and were 
later shovelled up and 
replaced back in barrels. 
Shipment was rejected 
by one Georgia 
company, but PCA 
signed for it and 
accepted the delivery 
 Harris and 
Barrett (2009) 
2012 Local Chinese TV 
broadcast 
  Undercover reporting 
by media 
TV reported that KFC’s 
supplier (Liuhe Group) 
in China added illegal 
drugs in chicken feed to 
accelerate their growth 
cycles.   
KFC’s products were 
boycotted and sales 
plummeted 25% by early 
2013. KFC stopped 
purchasing chickens from 
Liuhe Group. 
Tang and Babich 
(2014) 
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2014 Local Chinese TV 
broadcast 
  Local Chinese 
broadcast blew the 
whistle by airing 
footage of workers 
conducting 
fraudulent practices.   
TV report showed 
Shanghai Husi Food Co. 
Ltd. workers apparently 
picking up meat from the 
factory floor and mixing 
fresh meat together with 
expired meat; employees 
were overheard saying 
that if their clients knew 
what they were doing, 
the firm would lose its 
contract 
McDonald’s and Yum 
Brands Inc. (owner of KFC, 
Pizza Hut and Taco Bell) 
stopped using the supplier 
after the broadcast. The 
processing plant was sealed 
and products seized whilst 
Shanghai Municipal Food 
and Drug Administration 
investigated the allegations.  
Evans (2014) 
2016 Worker in abattoir  Worker secretly 
filmed more than 
170 hours that 
focused on 
mistreatment of 
animals inside an 
Australian abattoir.  
 Video sent to animal 
rights group Animals 
Australia who forwarded 
to the regulatory 
authority, PrimeSafe. 
PrimeSafe undertook an 
investigation, sanctioned the 
business and requested 
removal of four staff 
Farnsworth 
(2016) 
2017 Government health 
inspector in abattoir 
 Government health 
inspector went to 
Federal Police in 
2014 with concerns 
over illicit 
behaviour in a 
Brazilian 
slaughterhouse 
 
 
Alleged inappropriate 
practices in a slaughter 
plan. Alleged bribes paid 
by meat companies to 
government food-
sanitation inspectors.  
Undercover investigation 
launched and in March 2017 
over 100 arrests made. 
Temporary export bans put in 
place by many countries. 
Case ongoing 
Eisenhammer 
(2017) 
   992 
  993 
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Table 2 - Expolink – Incidence of issues (Adapted from Expolink, 2014; Expolink, 2016a; Expolink,  2016b) 994 
 995 
Year 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2016 
Theft 10% 12% 7% 7% 5% 4% 4% 
Fraud 8% 6% 5% 4% 6% 6% 5% 
Breach of company policy*   5% 5% 5% 6% 8% Nr 9% 
Unprofessional behaviour*  4% 5% 5% 7% 6% 6% 7% 
Nr – not reported *may not be illegal 996 
  997 
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Table 3. Review of existing whistleblowing models and applicability to food settings 998 
 999 
Focus Model Description Potential application in Food Settings References 
Public accounting The Graham 
Model –   
Greater perceived seriousness of 
wrongdoing, and personal responsibility 
and lower perceived personal cost predicted 
greater whistleblowing intention.  
A positive culture (mood) in food processing environment will 
encourage food production workers to have a greater sense of 
responsibility hence increased intention to whistleblow. Having 
procedures in place in the food business to protect the whistleblower 
and effective training, coaching and mentoring of staff will also 
increase the likelihood of whistleblowing  
Curtis (2006); Graham 
(1986); Schultz et al. 
(1993) 
Multiple 
 
Fairness-
loyalty 
tradeoff 
Individuals who value fairness over loyalty 
demonstrates increased willingness to 
report wrongdoings. 
Workers are motivated to whistleblow in the service of fairness and 
justice but can also appear disloyal to colleagues and the teams in 
which they operate, hence creating a dilemma that affects 
willingness to take action. This dilemma can be mediated by 
highlighting internal reporting channels and also ensuring 
anonymity to protect whistleblowers.  
Dungan et al. (2015); 
Waytz et al. (2013) 
Police agencies Theory of 
Planned 
Behaviour  
(TPB) 
Attitudes, subjective norm and perceived 
behavioural control had positive effects on 
internal whistleblowing intentions. 
Park and Blenkinsopp (2009) supported the relevance of TPB in 
whistleblowing intention. TBP is used as the basis of understanding 
and enabling whistleblowing intention among food production 
workers by influencing perceptions and thus attitude, subjective 
norm and perceived behavioural control.. 
Park and Blenkinsopp 
(2009); Rothwell and 
Baldwin (2006) Ajzen 
(1985, 1991) 
Multiple Theory of 
Reasoned 
Action 
(TRA) 
Prediction of intention through beliefs, 
attitude and subjective norms. 
TRA can be used to predict food workers’ intent to blow the whistle. Ajzen and Fishbein 
(1980); Fishbein and 
Ajzen (1975) 
Multiple The Henik 
model   
Model of the factors of influence in the 
whistleblowing decision making process 
through characterisation of potential 
whistleblowers into strategic moral 
guardians (SMG); fed-up vigilante (FUV) 
and servant of two masters (STM) via the 
influence of emotions. 
SMG retain their focus on halting wrongful activities, while FUV 
shift their focus to restitution. Thus, while anger is present in both 
cases, the goals, targets and methods of a whistleblowing disclosure 
depend on the source of the anger.  
Henik (2015) 
 1000 
 1001 
 1002 
 1003 
 1004 
 1005 
 1006 
 1007 
 1008 
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Table 4. Characterisation of actors in the whistleblowing process (Adapted from Henik, 2015; Goldberg et al. 1999) 1009 
 1010 
Characterisation Description 
Strategic moral 
guardian (SMG) 
Individual who focuses on accountability and results and who are motivated by strong extra-
organisational allegiances and emotion (anger) at organisational inaction following their internal 
reporting. They seek appropriate mechanisms that will limit personal or professional impact. 
Fed-up vigilante 
(FUV) 
Individual who is initially motivated to advocate against wrongful activities by strong extra-
organisational principles and is driven by revenge and  catharsis, justice and restitution. As they 
may have already suffered retribution they can feel they have nothing left to lose or fear.   
Servant of Two 
Masters (STM) 
Individual trying to manage conflicting values of potentially whistleblowing in order to protect 
victims or report wrongdoing and alternatively taking no action so that they can continue to 
observe activities but this might bring feelings of shame or regret.   
  1011 
  1012 
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Table 5. Causal factors for whistleblowing or to remain silent and associated countermeasures (Adapted from Yeates, 2012) 1013 
 1014 
Factors Action Inaction Food Crime Management System  
Transactional Transformational 
Individual 
Personal characteristics Moral purpose    
Empathy for victims  
Weakness of will  
Empathy for suspected respondent 
Awareness training during 
induction; Ongoing and 
updated training in 
examples of food crime. 
Documented and 
implemented 
whistleblowing policy with 
associated audit and 
verification programme 
  
Leading by example. 
Encouraging supportive, sense of 
belonging with a specific focus on  
team and group culture with 
common purpose. 
Loyalty to company and concern over 
wrongdoer and their impact on the 
organisation, staff and customers. 
Loyalty to wrongdoer who may be 
difficult to differentiate from the company  
Awareness Knowledge of what is illegal, unethical 
or immoral behaviour 
Ignorance or uncertainty about what is 
illegal, unethical or immoral behaviour  
Knowledge of reporting procedure Ignorance or uncertainty of reporting 
procedure 
Duty Sense of duty to report wrongdoing Belief that others will report the 
wrongdoing so inaction is acceptable 
Severity of wrongdoing (Near et al. 
2004; Caillier, 2016) 
Perception that wrongdoing is not 
significant. 
   
Situational and Organisational factors 
Consequences 
  
Positive impact e.g. to reduce future 
wrongdoing 
Fear of negative consequences e.g. 
retaliation to whistleblowers 
Protect confidentiality of 
whistleblower through 
effective procedures. 
Encourage supportive, sense of 
belonging with a specific focus on 
organisational culture 
Faith in the system Lack of faith in system  (e.g. employer is 
perceived to be non-responsive to 
complaints) (Nitsch et al., 2005) 
 1015 
 1016 
 1017 
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Organisation (Internal) 
(e.g. firm can eliminate 
or prevent further 
fraudulent practices, 
reduce loss of profit, 
reputation and trust 
External organisations 
(e.g. regulatory 
bodies, financial firms, 
public services saved 
resources as a result 
of early crime 
detection and 
reduction 
Society (e.g. protection 
against food fraud and 
crime, public health, 
costs) Whistleblowing  
Figure 1. Positive consequences of whistleblowing (Adapted from Bowers et al., 2012) 
Desire for positive 
consequences, e.g. to 
reduce future 
wrongdoing (Trevino 
and Victor 1992)  
Action against fraudulent 
activities hence resulting in 
positive change 
High ethical standards and 
increased public confidence 
(Yeates 2012) 
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 Trigger 
event 
Determining appropriate action 
(To whistleblow or remain 
silent?) 
Individual / 
personal factors 
Organisational / 
cultural factors 
Situational 
factors 
Action  
Inaction 
Organisation 
reaction to action 
Whistleblower 
response 
Figure 2. Whistleblowing strategies within the 5 stage whistleblowing model (Adapted from Henik 
2015) 
Food crime management system (FCMS) 
Type of actor: Servant of 
Two Masters 
Type of actor: Strategic moral 
guardian or Fed-up vigilante 
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